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RECOVERY FOR ENHANCEMENT AND BLIGHT
IN CALIFORNIA
Benefits or injuries expected to result from a public improvement
correspondingly influence the market value of land in the neighbor-
hood of the proposed project, causing either enhancement or blight.
The question whether a condemnee may recover for either enhance-
ment, or blight is largely a progeny of the 20th century.' The rel-
atively recent flood of cases on the subject may be attributed pri-
marily to a general increase in condemnation activities by public en-
tities.2  Moreover, modern complex procedures often create sub-
stantial delays3 between the planning and the execution of a public
project. Accordingly, it is a rare occasion when a planned public
work is able to approach execution without drawing the attention of
those persons living or owning property in the vicinity of the antici-
pated improvement. 4 If the project is of a desirable sort it cannot
help but foment a general property value rise in the neighborhood. 5
Conversely, if the work possesses undesirable attributes, values will
fall.0 When condemnation proceedings are finally initiated the prob-
lem thus focuses into a question of whether the condemnee is to re-
ceive the benefit of any increase in the value of his property due to
enhancement or, in a proper situation, he is to receive reimbursement
for any decrease in its value due to blight.
Since the question is basically a matter of what elements are to
be included in compensable value, it is first necessary to give attention
to the relevant California constitutional, statutory, and case law re-
garding the provisions for, and elements of, compensatory value. The
California Constitution provides: "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having
first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner. . . ."7 Further,
the term "just compensation" has been defined in Code of Civil
Procedure section 1249 to mean "actual value" at the date of is-
1 With the exception of San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63,
20 P. 372 (1888), the vast majority of the primary cases were decided from
1955 to the present.
2 Cf. ABA COMM. ON CONDEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE,
REPORT 93 (1962) (separate enhancement section first instituted) [hereinafter
cited as ABA REPORT].
3 See B. PALMER, MANUAL OF CONDEMNATION LAW § 154 (1961) [herein-
after cited as PALMER]; Note, Challenging the Condemnor's Right to Condemn:
Avoidance of Peripheral Damages, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 436, 438.
4 See 4 P. NICHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.3151, at 201 (rev.
ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
5 Id. at 201-02.
6 Id. at 201 (the project hovers like the "sword of Damocles").
7 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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suance of summons in the comdernation proceeding.s Finally,
through judicial construction, "actual value" has been held to mean
"market value."9 The standard of market value, adopted by the courts
of most states, 0 is typically defined as follows: Market value is "the
highest price estimated in terms of money which the land would bring
if exposed for sale in the open market, with reasonable time allowed
in which to find a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all of the uses
and purposes to which it was adapted and for which it was capable.""
Accordingly, any facts that would tend to influence the mind of a
reasonable buyer or seller as to the property's value are relevant to
the determination of just compensation.'12  Further, the provisions of
section 1249 that determine the date of valuation have been held to be
merely procedural,'3 thus vesting in the trial judge discretion to deter-
mine the admissibility of valuation evidence in various sets of cir-
cumstances.14 Also, in California the condemnee has the burden of
persuasion on the issue of market value.'5
In light of these rather unambiguous standards, it would appear
that all questions of enhancement and blight in California should be
easily settled. Paradoxically, some are not. The primary reasons for
the rather unsettled state of the law in this area are three: the diver-
gence of opinion between condemning agencies and property owners
regarding the elements comprising market value; the lack of any
clear statement of the law by the California Supreme Court;' 6 and the
failure of some of the districts of the Court of Appeal to elucidate their
applications of law to the facts.'7 The purpose of this comment, there-
8 CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1249. However, if there is a delay of one year
or more not caused by the condemnee, value is to be assessed as of the date
of trial. Id.
9 E.g., People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 401, 144 P.2d 799, 805 (1943).
10 See NIcHOLS § 12.1.
11 Sacramento So. R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 409, 104 P. 979, 980
(1909).
12 Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 533, 28 P. 681,
683 (1891).
'3 Los Angeles County v. Hoe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 291 P.2d 98 (1955);
Los Angeles v. Tower, 90 Cal. App. 2d 869, 204 P.2d 395 (1949); Los Angeles
v. Oliver, 102 Cal. App. 299, 283 P. 298 (1929).
14 Los Angeles County v. Hoe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 80, 291 P.2d 98, 101
(1955).
15 See, e.g., San Francisco v. Tilman Estate Co., 205 Cal. 651, 653-54, 272
P. 585, 586 (1928).
10 People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d 15 (1953), deals with a
problem not involved in the more controversial issues.
17 The statement by Justice McFarland in his dissenting opinion in Spring
Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 28 P. 681 (1891), is still rele-
vant. He said that "[t]here has been a good deal written upon the subject
of value in condemnation proceedings and a good deal of loose language has
been... used. . . ." Id. at 542, 28 P. at 685. This failure to enunciate, how-
ever, is not confined to California courts. See 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DorAiN §§ 99, 106 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGEL]; 27
January 1969]
fore, is to attempt to classify the existing California cases regarding
enhancement and blight according to their important factual differ-
ences, and to clarify any decisions that are ambiguous. Throughout
the comment it will be necessary, as a point of departure, to survey
the general trend of authority in the United States.
Enhancement of Values Caused by the Public Improvement
Probable or Certain Inclusion'8
One factual situation that presents few controversies is that in
which the condemned land was certain or likely to be within the scope
of the proposed project during the entire period the enhancement oc-
curred. Here, the enhancement has arisen solely because of the pros-
pect of the improvement's future erection on the property taken, with
no prior taking of adjacent land being involved. Under these circum-
stances, the rule adopted by the vast majority of American courts is
that the condemnee is not entitled to recover for the enhancement in
the value of his property.19 The Supreme Court of Florida, for ex-
ample, after a brief but incisive analysis of the problem, summarized
the general rule as follows: "[W]hen land is definitely marked for
condemnation ... it shares none of the beneficial effects which could
flow from anticipation of the proposed improvement for it will not be
available for private use when the project is completed. '20  Support
for this position may also be marshalled from the texts of legal
writers that have considered the question.
21
Am. JuR. 2D Eminent Domain § 283 (1966) (citing cases); Annot., 147 A.L.R.
66, 72 (1943).
Is The cases seem by nature to resolve themselves into the general classi-
fication used in the text. Accordingly, a similar scheme has been used by
others. See, e.g., NIcHOLS § 12.3151.
19 E.g., United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636
(1961); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943); J.A. Tobin Constr.
Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 422, 423 (10th Cir. 1965); Congressional School
of Aeronautics v. State Rds. Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 249-50, 146 A.2d 558, 565
(1958); Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 531, 190 N.E.2d 52, 56
(1963); see Kerr v. South Park Comm'rs, 117 .S. 379, 385 (1886); State Rd.
Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753, 754-55 (Fla. 1963); Chicago v. Blanton, 15
Ill. 2d 198, 203, 154 N.E.2d 242, 245 (1958); Alden v. Commonwealth, 351 Mass.
83, 85-86, 217 N.E.2d 743, 745-46 (1966) (statutory interpretation); Nichols v.
Cleveland, 104 Ohio St. 19, 29, 135 N.E. 291, 294 (1922). Contra, Calhoun v.
State H'way Dep't, 223 Ga. 65, 67, 153 S.E.2d 418, 420-21 (1967) (statute dis-
allowing enhancement held unconstitutional); Hard v. Housing Authority, 219
Ga. 74, 80, 132 S.E.2d 25, 29-30 (1963), rev'g, 106 Ga. App. 854, 128 S.E.2d 533
(1962); Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 466-67, 71 S.E. 903,
"908 (1911); Housing Authority v. Tork, 106 Ga. App. 41, 41-42, 126 S.E.2d 246,
247 (1962).
20 State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753, 754-55 (Fla. 1963); accord,
Nichols v. Cleveland, 104 Ohio St. 19, 29, 135 N.E. 291, 294 (1922).
21 See, e.g., ABA REPORT 125 & n.1 (1967); ABA REPORT 114 & n.1 (1966);
NICHOLS § 12.3151(1), at 206 n.5 (1962, Supp. 1968) (citing cases); ORcG.. §§
99, 100; PALmEa § 154.
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A substantial majority of the California decisions dealing with
enhancement fall into this category of probable or certain inclusion.
The California courts have uniformly expressed approval of the rule
adopted elsewhere in the United States.22 The fountainhead of the
California position is San Diego Land and Town Company v. Neale.
23
In Neale the condemnor had commenced a reservoir project that was
originally designed to inundate only its own land. It was soon dis-
covered, however, that inundation of the condemnee's upper riparian
lands would be required to store sufficient water for domestic and
agricultural purposes downstream. In the valuation trial, the con-
demnee was allowed to ask its expert witness what the value of the
property would be in light of the many benefits it would provide to
water consumers downstream. In essence, the witness was asked to
place a value on the property as though the proposed improvement
had already been completed. The trial court refused to exclude the
answer of the condenmee's witness, and judgment for a substantial
amount was rendered.
On appeal the Supreme Court of California held the trial court's
admission of evidence of enhanced value to be reversible error. The
court, referring to the witness' testimony, stated that "[t]his seems
to us inadmissible as a direct element of value. '24  Continuing, the
22 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 50, 62, 25 P. 977, 980
(1891) (appeal from decision on remand); San Diego Land & Town Co. v.
Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 74-75, 20 P. 372, 377 (1888); People ex rel. Department of
Natural Resources v. Brown, 255 A.C.A. 697, 699, 63 Cal. Rptr. 863, 364 (1967);
Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 343,
59 Cal. Rptr. 311, 315 (1967); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Di
Tomaso, 248 Cal. App. 2d 741, 767, 57 Cal. Rptr. 293, 310 (1967); People ex
rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Arthofer, 245 Cal. App. 2d 454, 465, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 878, 885 (1966); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Pera, 190
Cal. App. 2d 497, 500-01, 12 Cal. Rptr. 129, 130-31 (1961); San Diego v. Bog-
geln, 164 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 330 P.2d 74, 76 (1958); Los Angeles County v. Hoe,
138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 78, 291 P.2d 98, 100 (1955); Pasadena v. Union Trust Co.,
138 Cal. App. 21, 26, 31 P.2d 463, 466 (1934); see People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal.
2d 738, 754, 264 P.2d 15, 26 (1953) (overruled on other grounds); Spring
Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 536, 28 P. 681, 682-83 (1891)
(concurring opinion); Redevelopment Agency v. Ziverman, 240 Cal. App. 2d
70, 76, 49 Cal. Rptr. 443, 447 (1966); Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal. App. 369, 400,
244 P. 609, 621 (1926); Oakland v. Adams, 37 Cal. App. 614, 622, 174 P. 947,
950 (1918).
23 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372 (1888). In Neale the condemnees claimed en-
hanced value primarily from two sources: the prior commencement of the
reservoir project on adjacent property; and the fact that a reservoir was to
inundate their property. The former involved a supplementary taking wherein
enhancement was claimed to have arisen from the fact of adjacency to an
established project. For a discussion of this particular situation, see text
accompanying notes 117-19 infra. The present discussion is confined to en-
hancement claimed to have arisen from the fact that the reservoir project was
to cover the condemnee's land.
24 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 74, 20 P. 372, 377
(1888).
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court drew a significant distinction between direct and indirect ele-
ments of value, recognizing that the condemnee
might get some benefit from [the project] indirectly. That is to say,
the public knowledge of a proposed improvement might cause an
actual demand in the market and a subsequent advance in the cur-
rent rate of price .... But aside from this indirect benefit ... it
seems monstrous to say that the benefit arising from the proposed
improvement is to be taken into consideration as an element of the
value of the land.
25
Apart from its discussion of "indirect benefits," the court thus estab-
lished the rule that compensable value of condemned property may
not include an increment resulting from a direct benefit to the land by
reason of the very project for which it is condemned. More concretely,
the court is saying that once the site is determined, the attributes of
the project for which the land was requisitioned are wholly irrelevant
to the determination of the land's market value.
26
The decisions of the courts of the State of Georgia, representing
the minority position in the United States, 27 are directly contrary to
the California position. Mere numerical strength, however, does not
determine the "better rule." Accordingly, an in-depth analysis of
both the California and the Georgia positions is appropriate to probe
the soundness of the California doctrine.
The Georgia Constitution commands that private property shall
not be taken for public use without "just and adequate compensa-
tion."28  Although this provision is similar to that of the California
Constitution, there is a substantial policy divergence between the two
states. Illustrative of Georgia's policy approach is the rather literal
interpretation given by the Georgia courts to the language of that
state's "just compensation" provision.
In Hard v. Housing Authority 9 the site for an urban redevelop-
ment project had included the condemnee's land throughout the pe-
25 Id. at 74-75, 20 P. at 377. The significance of this distinction to Cali-
fornia law will be discussed subsequently in text accompanying notes 74-77
infra.
26 See NICHOLS § 12.3151(1), at 206 n.5. The treatise cites Neale to sup-
port the proposition "that in valuing the land, the effect of the proposed
improvement must be ignored." Id.
27 See, e.g., cases cited note 19 supra.
28 GA. CoNsT. art. I, § 3.
29 219 Ga. 74, 80, 132 S.E.2d 25, 29-30 (1963). Georgia's present position
on this issue was not crystallized without some recalcitrance from one of its
appellate courts. In Housing Authority v. Hard, 106 Ga. App. 854, 128 S.E.2d
533 (1962), the appellate court, in interpreting an earlier decision, Gate City
Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 71 S.E. 903 (1911), held that the court
in Gate City was faced with a situation quite different from that in Hard.
The court said Gate City involved enhancement arising prior to the designa-
tion of a project site, and, as such, it was properly allowed. But the court
refused to allow recovery of the enhancement in Hard because the project
site was certain during the period in which enhancement arose. This decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court holding that Gate
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riod in which enhancement allegedly arose. Nevertheless, the condem-
nee claimed that he was entitled to the market value of the property
as of the date it was actually taken by court proceedings. In sustain-
ing this contention as being within the intent and purpose of the "just
and adequate" provision of the Georgia Constitution, the supreme
court held that "[a]nything that actually enhances the value must be
considered in order to meet the demands of the Constitution that the
owner be paid before the taking, adequate and just compensation."3 0
It is clear from this decision and from its aftermath 1 that to the
Georgia court "just and adequate" means just and adequate solely to
the condemnee. The policy implicit in such an approach is the pro-
tection of the condemnee from a discrimination that would disallow
him the enhancement while allowing adjacent owners to reap such
benefits merely because they were fortunate enough not to have their
land condemned.3 2 The principle underlying this policy is defeated,
however, to the extent that the property owners nearby are specially
assessed for the improvement.
33
By contrast, the California case of People ex rel. Department of
Public Works v. Pera34 explicitly held that "[t]he term 'just compen-
sation' means 'just' not only to the party whose property is taken for
public use but also 'just' to the public which is to pay for it. '35 In
accordance with this interpretation of Article I, section 14 of the
California Constitution, the California courts have uniformly denied
compensation for enhancement accruing after the project site has been
definitely determined. 36 This is proper. Using as a "cutoff point"
the date on which the site is clearly established draws a proper bal-
ance between the private right and the public good. Moreover, such
exclusion of enhancement evidence does not subvert section 1249 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure because, as previously indi-
cated, section 1249 has been termed a procedural statute that creates
no vested rights.37  If such evidence of enhancement arising subse-
quent to the definite plotting of the project were admitted by the trial
City's facts were identical to those in Hard. Subsequently, the Georgia Leg-
islature, in defiance of the decision by the supreme court, passed a statute
denying recovery by the condenee of any enhancement caused by the project
for which the property was condemned. The law was held unconstitutional
in Calhoun v. State H'way Dep't, 223 Ga. 65, 67, 153 S.E.2d 418, 420-21 (1967),
as contrary to the "just and adequate" provision of the Georgia Constitution.
See GA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
30 Housing Authority v. Hard, 219 Ga. 74, 80, 132 S.E.2d 25, 29-30 (1963).
31 The holding in this case precipitated some adverse legislative activity.
See note 29 supra.
32 See ORGEL § 98.
33 See id.
34 190 Cal. App. 2d 497, 12 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1961).
35 Id. at 499, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
36 See cases cited note 22 supra.
37 See cases cited note 13 supra.
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judge, it might well be held to be an abuse of discretion. 8 By deter-
mining market value as of the day before the property was certain or
likely to be requisitioned the condemnor is not penalized, as it would
be in Georgia, for implementing the desirable practice of apprising
the public of a specific site. This is not to say that a public authority
should be given a license to condemn a definite site and then, in
typical bureaucratic fashion, unreasonably delay the official proceed-
ings.39 The provision in the Code of Civil Procedure setting valuation
as of the date of trial was not designed to protect against this type of
delay.
40
While market value is utilized by both states as the indicia of just
compensation,41 it is plain that the Georgia court, applying the minor-
ity rule, will encounter difficulty in arriving at the amount of the
award. It is questionable whether there is, in the first place, any true
market for property that has been labeled as a site for a public work.
42
Nevertheless, there are several methods by which the Georgia court
could arrive at a figure. One method would be to construct, through
the use of sales evidence of "similar" nearby property, a hypothetical
sale of the property condemned so as to compute its "quasi-market
value" as of the time of the taking. Since this is patently a fictional
approach, imputing to the property benefits that it would never pos-
sess, this quasi-market value approach has not been accepted by the
Georgia Supreme Court,43 and the procedure is disapproved of by
authorities generally.
44
Another alternative would be to "allow proof of any element...
that entered into fixing its value right up to the time it was taken."45
While this approach was approved by the court in Hard, it does not
reflect true market value and, moreover, is based on unsound policy.
88 But see Los Angeles v. Tower, 90 Cal. App. 2d 869, 204 P.2d 395 (1949).
39 Official proceedings ordinarily commence with the service of summons.
See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1249.
40 Id. It is interesting to note that the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
in an analogous situation, has provided a remedy for this problem by holding
that, if the public agency unnecessarily delays, the condemnee shall be entitled
to the market value of the property at the time it was taken including any
enhancement. Uehlinger v. State, 387 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
The facts in Uehlinger, however, are distinguishable from those in cases pres-
ently discussed to the extent that the site was designated and then condemned
in a piecemeal fashion. In Hard and other cases considered in this section
the entire site was taken in one action.
41 See, e.g., People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); Hard
v. Housing Authority, 219 Ga. 74, 132 S.E.2d 25 (1963).
42 See State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1963). "Once
selected for condemnation the marketability, both sale and rental, and to some
extent the use, of property is sterilized . . . ." Id. at 755.
43 Hard v. Housing Authority, 219 Ga. 74, 80, 132 S.E.2d 25, 30 (1963).
44 See, e.g., 2 J. LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN § 745 (3d ed. 1909); 27 Am. JuR.
2D Eminent Domain § 283, at 80 n.17 (1966) (citing cases).
45 Hard v. Housing Authority, 219 Ga. 74, 80, 132 S.E.2d 25, 30 (1963).
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True market value of property, as defined above, includes con-
sideration of a purchaser who is willing to buy the property "with
knowledge of all the uses" to which the property could be put.40
These uses referred to are "ordinary" uses, for if the property is
destined for condemnation the only long-term "use" for which it is
available is as a medium through which to speculate upon a large
condemnation award.47 Once it is known that the property is to be
included in the improvement, its actual marketable attribute-that of
adjacency to the project-has been extinguished, thus denying the
property's participation in the general rise in land values in the area.
As one author has stated:
The owner [and a fortiori a purchaser] of land taken for improve-
ment cannot put it to any use or enjoy its benefits, and any increase in
its value is due, not to its increased use by the owner or any benefits
he may get, but merely to speculation as to what the condemnor might
be willing or forced to pay for the property.
48
To call this speculative subterfuge a "use" runs counter to the gen-
erally accepted definition of market value.49  It forces the court to
engage in one of the practices against which the market value defini-
tion was intended to protect-the "vicious circle" of attempting to esti-
mate compensatory value in terms of expectation of the award finally
to be granted by the court.50
A final method that could be used to measure enhancement to
property definitely within the ambit of a proposed project would be to
value the property based upon either the need of the condemnor or
the beneficial aspects of the intended use by the condemnor. This,
clearly, would not reflect "true" market value because that value
contemplates private, not public use. Further, this approach mirrors
the direct element of value that was excluded by the California Su-
preme Court in Neale and its successors.51 Consider, for example,
the following cases. In People ex rel. Department of Natural Re-
sources v. Brown,5 2 a case involving condemnation for an earthfill
dam, the condemnee's claim for a valuation based upon the condem-
nor's need for his land in the project was rejected. In Pasadena v.
Union Trust Co. 53 the appellate court affirmed the exclusion of the
40 Sacramento So. R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 409, 104 P. 979, 980
(1909) (emphasis added).
47 See ORGEL § 106; PALMER § 154.
48 PALMFR § 154 (emphasis added).
49 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
5 Cf. ORGEL § 106.
51 See cases cited note 22 supra.
52 255 A.C.A. 697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1967). The facts as stated by the
court are sketchy. However, in the respondent's reply brief to a petition for
rehearing it is revealed that the land was within the scope of the project at
all times. See Reply Brief for Respondent for Petition for Rehearing at 14,
People ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Brown, 255 A.C.A. 697, 63
Cal. Rptr. 363 (1967).
53 138 Cal. App. 21, 31 P.2d 463 (1934).
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condemnee's evidence of his land's potential as a dam site5" where
joinder of his parcel with neighboring ones for this purpose would
not have been practical except for the imminence of the plaintiff's
reservoir project. Finally, as the court in Oakland v. Adams55 stated:
the fact that the city intended to acquire [the] property and use it for
park purposes should not cause it to be penalized, or that the incre-
ment in value which might attach to it because of the fact that the
city desired to acquire it to convert it into a city park should raise
its value to the city for that purpose. 56
As the above cases indicate, it is repugnant to one's sense of jus-
tice that a condemnor must include in its award an increment of value
stemming from the property being enhanced directly by the improve-
ment to be placed thereon;57 to attempt to value property in this
manner has also been considered to be quite speculative.58 Thus, if
the condemnor has not unreasonably delayed proceedings and if, from
the beginning of the project it was certain or highly probable that the
condemnee's property was to be included in the improvement, the
better rule, and that adhered to in California, is that the property is to
be valued as of the date that this certainty or probability arose.
Uncertain Inclusion
General Principles
On many occasions prior to the determination of a definite site
for the proposed public work, property values will rise in a broad
area, reflecting the anticipation of continued private ownership ad-
jacent, or at least proximate, to the improvement.59 The instant
problem arises when, within that broad area, a specific site is finally
chosen upon which to construct the improvement. The question is
whether the condemnee's award should include the increment stem-
ming from the anticipatory rise in values before the exact site is de-
termined. Unfortunately, many courts0 have failed to distinguish
between this situation where the enhancement arose before a definite
site for the improvement was selected and the situation discussed
previously where the enhancement arose after a definite site had been
established. As a consequence, the bulk of the American decisions
seems buried in a morass of irreconcilable conflict. This confusion
could have been avoided by means of detailed statements of facts
coupled with incisive applications of law. As put by one writer:
As to the enhancement in value resulting from the anticipated bene-
54 Id. at 26, 31 P.2d at 466.
55 37 Cal. App. 614, 174 P. 947 (1918).
56 Id. at 622, 174 P. at 950.
57 See ORGEL § 106. "'Market value at the time of taking' is the verbal
standard of compensation, but . . . the courts do not rigidly adhere to this
standard when ... the dictates of justice require a different rule." Id.
58 See PALMER § 154.
59 2 J. LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAIn § 745 (3d ed. 1909).
00 See note 17 supra.
[Vol. 20
ENHANCEMENT AND BLIGHT
fits from the public project, the judicial decisions are at variance, and
the failure of most courts to distinguish sharply between the enhance-
ment arising before the definite choice of a site for the project and the
increment accruing thereafter leaves it uncertain whether the different
holdings are the result of different rules or whether they are applica-
tions of the same rule to varying states of fact. 61
Enough courts, however, have made such a distinction to indicate
that there is a definite split of authority on this issue in the United
States.
62
Jurisdictions allowing recovery of the enhancement base their
decisions on the reasoning that such an increment is a bona fide com-
ponent of market value. For example, in Kerr v. South Park Com-
missioners,63 the United States Supreme Court approved the follow-
ing instructions:
A number of witnesses testified that the agitation of the park project,
the anticipation that the legislature would authorize the appropriation
of lands to establish a park in the vicinity of the present South Park,
and the introduction of the bill into the legislature ... materially en-
hanced the value of lands embraced in the present park lines, as well
as the lands adjacent thereto and in that vicinity. Any resulting bene-
fit to the lands within the proposed park from this . . . you should
take in account in determining the amount that will fairly compensate
the owner.
64
The instructions went on to deny compensation for any "special
61 ORGEL § 106, at 449-50 (emphasis added).
62 E.g., Kerr v. South Park Comm'rs, 117 U.S. 379, 387 (1886) (approved
instructions allowing recovery for this type of enhancement); State Rd. Dep't
v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753, 754 (Fla. 1963) (dictum); Sunday v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 62 Fla. 395, 397, 57 So. 351, 351 (1912); Housing Authority v. Hard, 106
Ga. App. 854, 857, 128 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1962), rev'd, 219 Ga. 74, 132 S.E.2d 25
(1963); Sanitary Dist. v. Loughran, 160 Ill. 362, 370, 43 N.E. 359, 361 (1896);
Snouffer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 105 Iowa 681, 683, 75 N.W. 501, 502 (1898);
Guyandotte Valley Ry. v. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417, 423, 50 S.E. 521, 523 (1905);
see NIcHOLS § 12.3151(2), at 210 n.9. Contra, Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Com-
munity Dev. Agency, 389 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Ky. 1965); Congressional School of
Aeronautics v. State Rds. Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 249-50, 146 A.2d 558, 565
(1958); Alden v. Commonwealth, 351 Mass. 83, 85-86, 217 N.E.2d 743, 745-46
(1966) (statutory interpretation); Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661,
665, 157 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1959) (statutory interpretation); NIcHOLS § 12.3151
(4), at 212 n.14 (citing cases). The relative scarcity of cases allowing or dis-
allowing recovery for this "anticipatory enhancement" may be attributed,
primarily, to the failure of most courts to distinguish between enhancement
before and after designation of the improvement site. Cf. text accompanying
note 61 supra. Unquestionably, many cases have involved "anticipatory en-
hancement," and it is not unlikely that recovery has been allowed for such
in some instances. However, the disposition of a court to allow this recovery
is often camouflaged by broad statements seemingly intended to deny any
type of project-caused enhancement. Id. To elucidate this significant distinc-
tion requires a substantial effort by the court, and, in this light, it would not
be unfair to conclude that many courts are at times rather indolent.
63 117 U.S. 379 (1886).
64 Id. at 385.
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benefit" to the property, such benefit arising from the specific ear-
marking of the property for the improvement. 65 The court thus dis-
tinguished between enhancement accruing before the site was deter-
mined and enhancement accruing thereafter, allowing recovery for
the former but not the latter. This case emphasizes the fundamental
proposition that during the period of uncertainty the true market
value of all property in the area rises because of bona fide expecta-
tions of adjacency, whereas once a site has been chosen, 66 enhance-
ment to property lying therein occurs only because of speculation
concerning the amount the condemnor will pay.
67
Some courts in denying this "anticipatory enhancement" have
argued that the condemnor should not be forced to pay for any incre-
ment stemming from the project,68 while others have reasoned that
since "the landowner is not to be penalized for any depreciation in
value attributable [to the project] the condemnor [is not] to be
required to pay for any enhancement .... "69 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts in Cole v. Boston Edison Company70 indi-
cated that if the original scheme raised even a possibility that the
subject parcel would be taken, there was to be no allowance for an
increment attributable to the indefinite plan.71 In Tharp v. Urban
Renewal and Community Development Agency,72 the Kentucky court,
reaching the same result, stated that the property was to be valued
"at the time just before it was generally known that the public proj-
ect would be performed.
1 73
65 Id.
66 See NICHOLS § 12.3151(2), at 77 (Supp. 68).
67 Cf. State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753, 754-55 (Fla. 1963);
Housing Authority v. Hard, 106 Ga. App. 854, 857, 128 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1962),
rev'd, 219 Ga. 74, 132 S.E.2d 25 (1963) (although reversed, case makes graphic
distinctions).
68 Cf. Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 665-66, 157 N.E.2d 209,
212 (1959).
69 Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency, 389 S.W.2d 453,
456 (Ky. 1965); see Congressional School of Aeronautics v. State Rds. Comm'n,
218 Md. 236, 249-50, 146 A.2d 558, 565 (1958).
70 338 Mass. 661, 157 N.E.2d 209 (1959). The court interpreted statutory
language which said that value was to be fixed "before the taking" to mean
"before the beginning of the entire public work which necessitates the taking."
Id. at 665, 157 N.E.2d at 212.
71 Id. at 666, 157 N.E.2d at 212. The court cited May v. Boston, 158 Mass.
21, 31, 32 N.E. 902, 904 (1893), as support for this proposition. Subsequently,
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 379 (1943), was cited as a better state-
ment of the rule the court was applying. The relevant passage in Miller,
however, spoke in terms of "probability" of being taken and not mere '"pos-
sibility." Accordingly, the test set down by the court was somewhat ambig-
uous.
72 389 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965).
73 Id. at 456.
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The California Position
Unfortunately, the California courts, with one exception, have not
clearly indicated their position on this controversy. The one excep-
tion is San Diego Land and Town Company v. Neale,74 an 1888 deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court that drew a sharp distinction
between "direct" and "indirect" benefits to the condemned prop-
erty.7 5 Of the latter the court stated that "the public knowledge of
a proposed improvement might cause an actual demand in the market
and a subsequent advance in the current rate of price."7 6 Unmistak-
able in this excerpt is the notion that, prior to the designation of the
improvement site, property values in a wide area will rise because of
the expected benefits to be derived from owning property proximate
to the improvement. This interpretation of the passage in Neale is
substantiated by reference to a jury instruction recommended as
proper for California condemnation cases:
You are instructed that it is improper for you to base your award
in this case, for the value of the part taken, on any direct increase
... in value arising from the construction of [the proposed project].
On the other hand, advance public knowledge of the proposed
project may or may not have had some effect upon the general mar-
ket in the area, and therefore, an indirect effect upon the value of the
property being taken. You may not speculate what that effect may
or may not have been, but you are to consider the general market as
you find it, and if there has been such an indirect effect upon the
market, the property owner is still entitled to the full and fair market
value of his property upon such market.
You are to determine the value the land being taken would have
had, if no action had been taken toward acquisition of this particular
property for the project.
7 7
The Neale case is cited as authority for this instruction. However,
NeaZe was decided in 1888 and Richard L. Huxtable, the author of
this proposed instruction, noted the following:
The second paragraph of the above instruction is believed by the
author to be a proper statement of the present law under the cases
cited .... But more recent cases dealing with resulting increase in
market value might be construed as requiring exclusion of both direct
and indirect effect upon the market.7 8
This is indeed a hint, if not more, of the rather murky and unsettled
state of California law on this subject.
As mentioned in the above comment, some cases might be con-
strued as excluding evidence of both indirect and direct effects on the
value of the property; but in several cases the language relating to
74 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372 (1888).
75 Id. at 74-75, 20 P. at 377; see text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
76 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 74-75, 20 P. 372, 377
(1888).
7 Huxtable, Trial Preparation, Discovery, Pretrial, and Jury Instructions,
in CALwoFRNiA CONDnvmATiON PRAcTicE 223, 260-61 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed.
1960) (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 261-62 (emphasis in the original) (citing no cases).
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such exclusions could be construed either as dictum, or as a very un-
clear statement of the applicable law. For example, in Pasadena v.
Union Trust Co.79 the condemnee offered evidence of his land's suit-
ability for a dam site. The proffered evidence was excluded by the
trial court and this result was affirmed on appeal. The issue was one
of direct valuation, i.e., whether or not it was proper to value the land
as a dam site merely because the plaintiff had determined to build a
dam there. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal went on to say: "Any
rise in value before the taking, not caused by the expectation of that
event, is to be allowed, but ... it must be a rise in what a purchaser
might be expected to give."80 If the court here was referring, by use
of the phrase "[a] ny rise in value . . . not caused by the expectation
of that event", to an indirect increase of the property value before a
definite site is determined because of advance public knowledge of
the improvement, the statement is indeed dictum. This must be so
because the issue on appeal was not alleged error in denying evidence
of indirect enhancement. The more plausible conclusion, however, is
that the court was merely rejecting evidence of direct enhancement
with an ambiguous application of the Neale rule. Support for this
conclusion is found in the last clause in the above-quoted statement
of the court: "but ... it must be a rise in what a purchaser might be
expected to give."8' This phrase implies that, although direct ele-
ments of enhancement must be excluded, it is proper to admit ele-
ments of value that a purchaser in the open market would consider,
which would certainly include a purchaser's anticipation or hope of
eventually owning land next to a public improvement, the exact site
of which is still unknown. Whereas Union Trust, therefore, is basi-
cally consistent with Neale, the ambiguity of the language used could
erroneously cause one to conclude otherwise. Nor is Union Trust
alone. There are other decisions, more recent than Union Trust, that
also might be construed as requiring the exclusion of both direct and
indirect benefits.
In Los Angeles County v. Hoe8 2 the condemnor was endeavoring
to acquire property for a civic center governmental office site. The
condeinee's expert witness testified over the condemnor's objection
that the City of El Monte had selected the lot adjacent to that of the
condenmee for its city hall. On appeal the condemnor contended that
it was error to admit the testimony because it allowed the condemned
property to be valued in light of the project to be built thereon. The
basis of this contention was the alleged fact that Los Angeles County
had joined with the City of El Monte to construct a complete govern-
mental center, which would include the adjacent parcel designated for
the El Monte City Hall. The condemnee's witness testified, however,
that he had no knowledge of such a joint effort. In addition he stated
79 138 Cal. App. 21, 31 P.2d 463 (1934).
80 Id. at 26, 31 P.2d at 466 (emphasis added).
81 Id.
82 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 291 P.2d 98 (1955).
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that he did not consider the county project in valuing the land, recog-
nizing that it would be improper to do so. The court affirmed the
decision, finding that there was only a prospective or contingent
joint effort between Los Angeles County and the City of El Monte,
and further stated, "It is the law, as stated by appellant, that in arriv-
ing at a determination of the market value of [the] land... it is not
proper to consider the increase, if any, in the value of such land by
reason of the proposed improvement which is to be made on the land
by the condemnor.
' '83
Does this rather broad statement disallow any recovery for "in-
direct enhancement" as defined by Neale? One reason for concluding
that it does not is supplied by a close scrutiny of the facts. The con-
demnor was arguing that there was only one large project, encompass-
ing both the condemnee's property and the adjacent property, so that
any consideration of the condemnee's property as enhanced by the
city hall project would be improper as allowing evidence of direct en-
hancement. This the court rejected, finding that there was no joint
undertaking. The court, therefore, in making the above statement
was merely informing the appellant that, although it stated the law
correctly, the proposition was not applicable to the present case be-
cause there was no question of direct enhancement. 84 Further, the
court in Hoe cited Neale as authority for its ruling. It is quite
doubtful that the court intended to state a proposition that was con-
trary to the very case cited to support it, and in this light Neale and
Hoe are reconcilable.
In San Diego v. Boggeln85 the situation was analogous to that in
Hoe. Boggeln involved condemnation efforts by the City of San Diego
for a park and recreation area. Proceedings began in 1945 but were
dismissed in 1952. In the interim a new project was begun in con-
junction with the federal government. At trial, the city offered evi-
dence to show that the land in question had been encompassed in the
project since 1945. If admitted, such evidence would have denied the
condemnee any compensation for enhancement that arose prior to the
official commencement of the joint project. The appellate court af-
firmed the decision excluding the evidence, holding that the evidence
was unnecessary because the parties had stipulated that the property
was within the project's ambit since 1945, and the instructions of the
trial court effectively charged the jury to ignore any enhancement
resulting from its definite inclusion. The appellant cited Hoe,86 but
83 Los Angeles County v. Hoe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 78, 291 P.2d 98, 100
(1955).
84 The question involved, although not made perfectly clear by the court,
was one of supplementary taking by an established project. See text accom-
panying notes 114-16 infra. This is substantiated by reference to respondent's
reply brief. Reply Brief for Respondent at 7, Los Angeles County v. Hoe, 138
Cal. App. 2d 74, 291 P.2d 98 (1955).
85 164 Cal. App. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 74 (1958).
80 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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the court, while agreeing with its statement of law, held that it was
not applicable because both the stipulation and the trial court instruc-
tions effectively excluded any danger of direct enhancement.8 7 The
court, therefore, although approving the sweeping language of Hoe,
was doing so only to the extent that it was the correct rule as stated
in Neale for the exclusion of direct enhancement evidence.
A final case in which the broad language of Hoe8s is indiscrim-
inately cited is Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson.8 9
The condemned property had been included in the scope of a rede-
velopment project from its inception. Accordingly, the court adhered
to the general rule and held it was proper for the trial court to pro-
hibit the cross-examination of the condemnor's expert witness when
"[s]uch inquiry would have elicited evidence bearing upon the ...
enhancement of defendant's property as a result of the redevelop-
ment."90 Again, this broad language although intended to state only
the rule disallowing direct enhancement, casts doubt upon the "direct-
indirect" distinction drawn in Neale.9 1
Two quite recent cases pose even greater barriers to any attempt
to synthesize California law on this subject. In Redevelopment
Agency v. Ziverman92 instructions proffered by the condemnee dis-
tinguishing between direct and indirect benefits were rejected by the
trial court. The instructions were substantially the same as those set
out in Huxtable's article,8 and believed by him to be a correct state-
ment of the law of California according to the Neale case. In affirm-
ing the decision of the trial court, the appellate court stated the
"general rule" that the condemnation project was not to be a factor in
determining the market value of the condemned property94 and to
support this conclusion cited Pasadena v. Union Trust Co.95 As was
87 San Diego v. Boggeln, 164 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 330 P.2d 74, 77 (1958).
88 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
89 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967). The Hoe quotation was
also used in People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Di Tomaso, 248 Cal.
App. 2d 741, 57 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1967). The court made it clear, however, that
the quotation's applicability was limited to the exclusion of direct enhance-
ment. In the opinion, the quotation was prefaced by the following: "Con-
demnor equates... [its contention] with an attempt to increase the value of
the property being taken by considering its value as though the improvement
was made." Id. at 767, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
90 Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 336,
343, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311, 315 (1967).
91 The case of People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Pera, 190 Cal.
App 2d 497, 12 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1961), using language comparable to that in
Neale, held that the trial court properly instructed that "enhancement in
value arising solely and directly from the proposed public improvement" is
not to be considered. Id. at 500, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
92 240 Cal. App. 2d 70, 49 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1966).
98 See text accompanying note 77 supra.
94 Redevelopment Agency v. Ziverman, 240 Cal. App. 2d 70, 76, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 443, 447 (1966).
95 138 Cal. App. 21, 31 P.2d 463 (1934).
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previously demonstrated, Union Trust was a case in which the court
approved the trial court's exclusion of evidence of direct enhancement.
The proffered instructions in Ziverman purported to do just that,
namely, to exclude evidence of direct enhancement. In addition to
this, however, the proferred instructions would have allowed the jury
to compensate for indirect enhancement. Nevertheless, if the court
relied on Union Trust as authority for the proposition that an in-
direct enhancement in value could not be considered, Union Trust was
improperly cited. The court equivocated, however, and nullified its
citation of Union Trust by stating that since there was no evidence
introduced at trial as to any effect of the prospect of condemnation,
the instruction was not pertinent to any issue in the case. Its exclu-
sion, therefore, was not prejudicial and the court did not have to de-
cide whether the proffered instruction was correct. It is doubtful,
therefore, that the court in Ziverman was attempting to destroy the
distinction in Neale.
In the case of People ex rel. Department of Public Works v.
Arthofer,90 a rather anomalous situation was presented wherein the
court stated a rule, yet purported to rely on authority directly con-
trary to the rule stated. The case involved condemnation for freeway
purposes. The condemnee purchased property near a major boulevard
three months prior to the commencement of the condemnation. Al-
though the parcel was zoned R-1 (single family dwellings) the con-
demnee intended to use it for R-3 purposes (apartments, etc.), hoping
to obtain a zone change. While such changes had been allowed in the
general area, the purchaser was unable to obtain any such variance.
The State's witness testified that any zone changes in the area since
1956 were due to knowledge of the contemplated freeway and that,
without the freeway, there would have been no such changes. The
opinion noted that the subject property had been within the scope of
the freeway project since 1960. The appellate court held that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in not permitting the condemnee's
witness to express an opinion regarding the reasonable probability
of a zone change.97 One of the reasons given for affirming the ruling
was the witness' "inability to establish that . . . [zoning changes in
nearby property] had occurred prior to knowledge of the construction
of the freeway .... '98 Continuing, the court stated:
The law is likewise clear that in forming an opinion as to reason-
able probability of a zone change, a witness must exclude all consid-
eration of the effect of the proposed improvement, and knowledge of
the impending improvement may not be considered as a factor in
determining the fair market value [citing Neale] .... [A]ny testi-
mony of reasonable probability of zone change may not take into
account the proposed freeway or any influence arising therefrom. 99
There was no dispute at trial that the property in question was not
90 245 Cal. App. 2d 454, 54 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1966).
97 Id. at 464, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
99 Id. at 465, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 885 (emphasis added).
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likely to be within the scope of the project until 1960 and that zoning
changes had occurred, in anticipation of the freeway, since 1956. In
light of these facts a comparison is warranted between the above
quotation from Arthofer and the statement in Neale that a condemnee
could derive an indirect benefit from the fact that "the public knowl-
edge of a proposed improvement might cause an actual demand in
the market and a subsequent advance in the current rate of price."100
The apparent conflict between these two statements might be dis-
pelled by interpreting "knowledge" in the Arthofer quotation to mean
the "knowledge of the witness," thus applying the Neale rule exclud-
ing evidence of direct enhancement, i.e., the witness may not value
the property by reference to his knowledge of the condemnor's project
to be erected thereon. This position, however, is untenable for two
reasons. First, the Arthofer quotation goes on to say that testimony
of enhanced value because of a reasonable probability of a zone change
"may not take into account the proposed freeway or any influence
arising therefrom,"'1 which would include both the knowledge of the
valuation witness (direct enhancement) and the knowledge by the
general public of the advent of the freeway before its boundaries had
been determined (indirect enhancement). Yet, indirect enhancement
is precisely the element that Neale held may be considered.
Secondly, the appellate court approved the trial judge's ruling
that not only was the condemnee's witness precluded from expressing
an opinion on project-influenced zone changes causing a rise in prop-
erty values occurring subsequent to 1960, when the property was
certain to be taken, but he was precluded from expressing any opinion
on those zone changes occurring prior to 1960 as well. Since the zone
changes in the area began in 1956, it would have been proper, under
Neale, for the witness to consider the effect of the project on land
values in the area as enhanced by project-caused zone changes occur-
ring prior to 1960, the date that a definite site was established. To
allow this consideration would be merely to take into account a rise
in property values in a general area due to the anticipation of an
improvement, the boundaries of which had yet to be designated.
Is Arthofer contrary to Neale? Although the Arthofer court men-
tioned the fact that the condemnee's offer of proof failed to demon-
strate that the exclusion of evidence was prejudicial, it would be er-
roneous to conclude that the decision rested on this minor procedural
ground in light of the unmistakable and forceful language used in
the opinion.10 2 Moreover, the court, although citing Neale, could
not have been merely vaguely applying the Neale rule disallowing
"direct" enhancement because the situation in Arthofer involved en-
hancement that was claimed to have arisen prior to the property's
100 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 74, 20 P. 372, 377
(1888) (emphasis added).
101 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Arthofer, 245 Cal. App. 2d
456, 465, 54 Cal. Rptr. 878, 885 (1966) (emphasis added).
102 Id. at 464-65, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
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inclusion in the project. Accordingly, the conclusion must be that the
court misinterpreted the "direct" enhancement rule in Neale and in-
discriminately applied it to a situation proper for the "indirect" en-
hancement rule. To the extent of this misinterpretation the cases are
indeed contrary.
Thus, the question is raised as to which is the better rule to be fol-
lowed in California. It is suggested that the distinction drawn in San
Diego Land and Town Company v. Neale between "direct" and "indi-
rect" enhancement be preserved, notwithstanding the age of the case.
It is a workable distinction designed to assure that justice be done to
both condemnor and conderrmee'0 3 and, in doing so, achieves a proper
balance between the private right and the public good.
The Neale distinction, in addition, is one that best reflects the
rule that market value is to be the index for just compensation. 104
As previously discussed, land that is certain to be enclosed within a
public improvement cannot increase in true market value, i.e., there
is no potential for adjacency coupled with private ownership.0 5 Con-
versely, knowledge that a public improvement is likely to be con-
structed at some location within a vague general area cannot help
but stimulate a rise in property values within that area. 0 6 This in-
crease in value, although caused by anticipation of the improvement,
is an increase in true market value since property owners and those
who would purchase from them consider property owned near a pub-
lic improvement capable of being used in many more beneficial ways
than it would be in absence of the improvement. Therefore, bearing
in mind the definition of market value, °'0 an increment attaching to
the property prior to its certain or highly probable inclusion in the
project should be compensated for by the condemning agency. As
stated by one writer,
When . . . the preliminary discussion has enhanced the value of the
land in the neighborhood, the courts have not been inclined to create
an exception to the general rule that market value at the time of the
taking is the conclusive test and it is usually held that the owner is
entitled to the benefit of the appreciation in value from the general
expectation that the improvement for which it was taken would soon
be constructed.' 0 8
Accordingly, to exclude evidence of this enhancement would be an
abuse of discretion by the trial judge sufficient to deny the condemnee
the "just compensation" that is guaranteed him in California Consti-
tution. 0 9 In more practical terms, valuation is to be made as of the
day before the date it became certain or probable that the property
was to be condemned for the project.
103 See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
104 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
105 See PALmER § 154; text accompanying note 48 supra.
100 See text accompanying note 59 supra.
107 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
108 NiCHOLS § 12.3151(2), at 209-10.-
109 See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 14.
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Property Condemned to Supplement a Previously Existing Project
Not infrequently an established public improvement must be ex-
panded to meet greater demands. When adjacent land is condemned
for this purpose, the condemnee usually requests compensation for
the increment of value that has accrued to his property by reason of
its past adjacency to the improvement. This situation differs from
the two previously discussed situations where enhancement was
claimed to have arisen from the anticipation of the project and not,
as here, from its prior establishment. This situation, however, must
be considered in light of two possible factual variations: (1) where it
was not probable, upon original establishment of the project, that the
subject parcel would be included in an expansion; and (2) where it was
definite or at least probable that the condemnee's parcel would sub-
sequently be enveloped. The great weight of authority allows re-
covery for the added value in the first instance,110 but denies it in the
second."'
Lack of Probable Inclusion
Speaking for the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. Miller,112 Mr. Justice Roberts clearly stated the applicable rule
where it is not probable at the time the project is initiated that the
condemned parcel would be later included:
If a distinct tract is condemned, in whole or part, other lands in the
neighborhood may increase in market value due to the proximity of
the public improvement erected on the land taken. Should the gov-
ernment at a later date, determine to take these other lands, it must
pay their market value as enhanced by this factor of proximity.113
Two California decisions have dealt directly with this matter. In
the more recent, Los Angeles County v. Hoe,11 4 the plaintiff sought to
condemn land for a civic center. The City of El Monte had previously
acquired the property adjacent to the land in question for a city hall
11) See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943); J.A. Tobin
Constr. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1965); Blas v. United
States, 261 F.2d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 1958); Tigertail Quarries, Inc. v. United
States, 143 F.2d 110, 111 (5th Cir. 1944); Playa De Flor Land & Improvement
Co. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 281, 374-75 (D.C.C.Z. 1945); Andrews v.
State, 9 N.Y.2d 606, 608, 176 N.E.2d 42, 42-43, 217 N.Y.S.2d 9, 10 (1961) (mem.);
Dallas v. Rash, 375 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); ORGEL § 99; cf. ABA
REPORT 126 & nn.1 & 4 (1967); ABA REPORT 115 & n.1 (1966); NiCHOLS § 12.1351
(3), at 211 n.10 (Supp. 1968); Address by Mendes Hershman, Esq., New York
City Bar Association, Committee on Real Property, Feb. 18, 1965.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943); Tigertail
Quarries, Inc. v. United States, 143 F.2d 110, 111 (5th Cir. 1944); United States
v. 85.11 Acres of Land, 243 F. Supp. 423, 425 (N.D. Okla. 1965); ABA REPORT
113 (1966); NICHOLS § 12.3151(3); ORGEL § 100.
112 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
113 Id. at 376.
114 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 291 P.2d 98 (1955). For a detailed statement of the
facts, see text accompanying note 83 supra.
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site. The court held" 5 that, since there was no evidence that Los
Angeles County and the City of El Monte had originally intended to
purchase jointly all the property involved, it was not improper for
the condemnee's valuation witness to consider that the El Monte City
Hall was to be constructed next door."
G
In the case of San Diego Land & Town Company v. Neale,"7 one
of the questions involved was the valuation of property in light of its
adjacency to a reservoir project that later had to be expanded. The
court stated, "So far as the value of the land in controversy may have
been increased to purchasers generally by the construction and use of
the plaintiff's dam and reservoir ... such fact should be considered
.... "1s The court also noted that
[t]he jury had a right to consider the fact, in determining the market
value, that the land in controversy was in proximity to a dam site, and
to consider its adaptability for reservoir purposes, and to determine
whether or not its market value had been enhanced by improvements
put upon adjoining property .... 119
Although the California authority on this matter is sparse, it is
sound, and in accord with the majority position in the United States
as postulated in United States v. Miller. 20 Assuming that the proj-
ect's expansion was not probable, inclusion of the enhancement is
inescapable. By analogy to anticipatory enhancement of property
values as the result of an undetermined project site, the market value
of property adjacent to an already established project is doubtlessly
increased by such adjacency.1 21 This increase is thus a proper element
of true market value, for which compensation must be made.
Probable or Definite Inclusion
If it is certain or probable that the condemnee's land will be in-
cluded in the original project by a future proceeding, the authorities
are united in disallowing any increase in compensation by reason of
the condemned parcel's adjacency to the improvement. 22 The clear-
est exposition of the rule followed by virtually all courts123 is again
115 The holding of the court was somewhat ambiguous. However, a close
analysis of the case coupled with a reference to the respondent's reply brief
will indicate that the court did indeed allow the condemnee to recover for
enhancement due to the adjacent city hall project. See Reply Brief for Re-
spondent at 7, Los Angeles County v. Hoe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 291 P.2d 98
(1955) (cites Miller and clarifies the holding in Hoe).
116 Accord, Dallas v. Rash, 375 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
17 88 Cal. 50, 25 P. 977 (1891). Anticipatory enhancement was also
claimed. See text accompanying notes 74-77 supra.
I's San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 50, 65-66, 25 P. 977, 981
(1891).
119 Id. at 66, 25 P. at 981.
120 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
121 See text accompanying note 59 supra.
122 See authorities cited note 111 supra.
123 But see cases cited note 29 supra.
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found in United States v. Miller,'1 24 where the court stated, "If... the
public project from the beginning included the taking of certain tracts
but only one of them is taken in the first instance, the owner of the
other tracts should not be allowed an increased value for his lands
which are ultimately to be taken . ... "125 The court here was re-
ferring to an instance in which the condemnee's land was definitely
determined to be within the confines of the project from the outset.
The court was careful to point out, however, that definiteness of in-
clusion is not always necessary to deny the owner's claim for en-
hancement.
If... [the parcels] were within the area where they were likely to be
taken for the project, but might not be, the owners were not entitled
... to an increment of value calculated on the theory that if they had
not been taken they would have been more valuable by reason of their
proximity to the land taken.126
Thus, the condemning agency can avoid payment of any claimed
enhancement by producing evidence showing that it was probable,
from the beginning of the original work, that the condemnee's lands
would be eventually included within the geographical scope of the
project. 27 In supplementary takings, logical considerations require
the conclusion that, once it is determined that the land was probably
or definitely within the initial ambit of the overall project, its genuine
market value, under the rule of Miller must include no consideration
of enhancement by reason of the project. While the California appel-
late courts have yet directly to accept or reject the rule as stated in
Miller, it is submitted that Miller is sound and should be followed.
However, even though expansion of the original project to en-
compass the condemnee's property is certain, if the condemnor un-
reasonably delays acquisition of the property the owner might be able
to recover for adjacency enhancement. In a recent Texas case,128 the
condemnor had designated a specific area but embarked upon a piece-
meal approach to acquire the necessary land, and unnecessarily de-
layed acquisition of certain tracts. The owner of later taken property
was allowed to recover the value of the property at the date of taking,
including claimed enhancement 2 9 While this recovery unquestion-
ably included enhancement elements that would not be reflected in
true market value, the Texas court chose to stress the unjustifiable
procrastination of the condemnor. In effect, the Texas court, in con-
struing its pertinent constitutional provision, 30 modified the rule of
Miller with equitable considerations. The California courts ought to
take cognizance of the rule of this case in interpreting the condemna-
124 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
125 Id. at 376-77.
126 Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
127 See id.
128 387 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
129 Id. at 432.
130 TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
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tion section of the California Constitution.'"'
Depression of Values Caused by the Public Improvement-
Planning Blight
The problem examined here is distinguishable from those dis-
cussed previously in that here the proposed public project, instead of
enhancing property values, depresses them. Depreciation of property
values by a proposed public improvement can occur in cases in which
the site of the improvement is either definite or indefinite, or where
the condemnee's property is the object of a supplementary taking for
an already established improvement. Frequently, long-range plan-
ning, especially in urban renewal projects, dampens any incentive to
keep property within the proposed area in good repair. Owners and
tenants move away, thereby inviting further deterioration through
vandalism. 132 The same results may occur even though the bound-
aries of the project have not been defined, but only an announcement
of a proposed project has been made.13 3 The question thus arises
whether the condemnee may recoup, as part of the fair market value
of his property, the amount of depreciation that has occurred by
reason of the project for which his land is condemned.
There is no general consensus on this issue. Indeed, the courts in
the United States are sharply divided. Those disallowing the con-
demnee any recoupment for blight do so for a variety of reasons. For
example, one court, interpreting literally a statute requiring damages
to be assessed as of the date of the taking, held that any depreciation
prior to the land's official requisition simply could not be recovered. 34
Other courts have either completely ignored any loss of value caused
by the undesirable nature of the prospective improvement, 3 5 or,
while recognizing the existence of an injury, have held such injury to
be damnum absque injura due to the lack of a "taking."'1 36  A few
cases within this group classify such damages as noncompensable "in-
cidents of ownership."'137 Another approach used to deny recovery is
to argue that computation of such damages would be too speculative,
and deny the existence of any "method of compensating an owner for
131 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
132 Note, Challenging the Condemnor's Right to Condemn: Avoidance of
Peripheral Damages, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 436, 438 & nn.8-10 (1967).
133 Id. at 439 & n.15; see NICHOLS § 12.3151.
134 See Saint Louis Housing Authority v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144, 147-48
(Mo. 1965). Contra, Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 665, 157 N.E.2d
209, 212 (1959).
135 Note, Challenging the Condemnor's Right to Condemn: Avoidance of
Peripheral Damages, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 436, 439 & n.14.
136 Id. at 440 & n.18 (citing cases). The same has been held regarding
plotting the project on a formal map. Id. at 441 & n.22.
137 See, e.g., Sorbino v. New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554, 129 A.2d 473
(Super. Ct. 1957).
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such consequences of congressional action.'
38
Although the above authorities are still considered "good law,"
there has been a significant and swelling movement toward the con-
trary position. Illustrative of this trend is the decision by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia Electric & Power
Company,'13 9 involving condemnation of a flowage easement for reser-
voir purposes. Mr. Justice Stewart made it clear in his opinion that
"[t] he value of the easement must . . . [not be] diminished by the
special need which the government had for it .... The court must
exclude any depreciation in value caused by the prospective taking
once the government was committed to the project .... -140
The attack waged by the authorities for this position is derived
from two basic premises. The first of these is that it would be unjust,
and, therefore, against public policy, to allow a public authority to
depress property values in an area and then, by finally designating a
site, gain an undeserved windfall through having the condemned par-
cel valued as of the date it is officially taken.141 Accordingly, while
"market value at the time of taking" is the standard to which lip ser-
vice is given, a different rule is oftentimes used for the sake of jus-
tice.142 The result is that various rules have been formulated by the
courts to avoid the harsh effects of a literal statutory interpretation.143
138 United States v. Certain Lands, 47 F. Supp. 934, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
noted in ORGEL § 105, at 449 n.52.
139 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
140 Id. at 636; accord, Playa De Flor Land & Improvement Co. v. United
States, 70 F. Supp. 281, 357 (D.C.C.Z. 1945). Mendes Hershman cited Virginia
Electric in his address of February 18, 1965 to the New York City Bar Associa-
tion, Committee on Real Property, and stated that the property owner should
be protected against decrease in value caused by the project, not only when
the project goes through, but if withdrawn. Nichol's treatise takes substan-
tially the same position. See NicHOLS § 12.3151 (2) (Supp. 1968).
141 See 2 J. LEWIs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 745 (3d ed. 1909); ORGEL § 105.
"To allow a public agency to depress market values in a particular neighbor-
hood by threatening to erect an offensive structure in its midst, and then to
take advantage of this depression in paying for the land required for the
structure would be so abhorrent to the public sense of justice that it has
never been seriously argued that it could be done." NicHOLS § 12.3151(2), at
209. Although this statement refers only to an "offensive structure," the
same conclusions should be drawn regarding an "unoffensive structure" the
advent of which caused a depreciation in property values.
142 ORGEL § 106.
143 See, e.g., State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753, 756-57 (Fla. 1963)
(property valued as though no threat of condemnation); Tharp v. Urban Re-
newal & Community Dev. Agency, 389 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Ky. 1965) (property
valued at time prior to public knowledge of project); Congressional School
of Aeronautics v. State Rds. Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 250, 146 A.2d 558, 565
(1958); Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 665, 157 N.E.2d 209, 212
(1959) (property valued before beginning of "entire public work"); Cleveland
v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 532-33, 190 N.E.2d 52, 57 (1963) (property
valued before city "took active steps"); Hermann v. North P.R.R., 270 Pa. 551,
554, 113 A. 828, 829 (1921) (incohate right for which condemnor must pay).
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The second premise, exemplified by Foster v. Detroit,'" takes a
position directly contrary to many authorities1 45 and holds that
the actions of the [condemnor] which substantially contributed to
and accelerated the decline in value of plaintiff's property constituted
a 'taking' of plaintiff's property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment [to the United States Constitution], for which compen-
sation must be paid.146
Cases have arisen wherein the mere long-range planning and mapping
of a project have caused a substantial decrease in property values.147
Taken literally, the above quotation could be construed to hold that
the mere mapping of a project constitutes a "taking" for which com-
pensation must be paid if values fall. This conclusion, however,
would be erroneous. A survey of the facts of the Foster case indicates
that the actions taken by the condemnor went far beyond a mere
mapping and were so extreme as to justify the holding that there had
been a "taking" even before official condemnation had been instituted.
The City of Detroit began to plan for urban redevelopment well
in advance of initiating condemnation proceedings. The plan was
carried just short of the point of final execution (physical taking) and
then abandoned. A second plan was later begun, and nearly all the
property surrounding the condemnee's parcel was condemned and
buildings destroyed. The condemnee's property, never officially taken
before the second plan was begun, was vandalized almost to the extent
of total destruction. The property was finally condemned officially
and taken for a meager sum under a "value at the time of taking"
statute. The condemnee then sued to recover the alleged deficit.
The extreme circumstances of this case seem to align it with others
that have held, under similar facts, that justice demanded recognition
of a compensable "taking."'148 Thus, Foster is somewhat questionable
authority for the sweeping proposition that the planning or mapping
of a project is a "taking" for which compensation must be paid in the
event of a fall in property values.
In California, certain districts of the Court of Appeal are em-
broiled in the conflict of whether a condemnee should be allowed
to recover for blight. The First and Second Appellate Districts hold
that the condemnee may not recoup depreciation resulting from the
planned project,149 while the Third and Fourth hold such depreciation
'44 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
145 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
146 Foster v. Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 665-66 (E.D. Mich. 1966); accord,
Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 318, 136 N.W.2d 896, 900 (1965).
147 See note 132 supra.
148 E.g., In re Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 95 A. 429 (1915); see
Annot., 64 A.L.R. 546, 551-52 (1928).
149 Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d
336, 343, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311, 315 (1967) (2d District); Oakland v. Partridge, 214
Cal. App. 2d 196, 203, 29 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (1963) (1st District); People v.
Lucas, 155 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 317 P.2d 104, 107 (1957) (1st District); Atchison,
T. & S.F.R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 518, 57 P.2d 575, 581
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compensable.150 The position taken by these latter courts was sum-
marized in the case of Buena Park School District v. Metrim Corpo-
ration,'51 in which the court stated:
It is a matter of common knowledge that a purchaser would not buy
property in the process of being condemned except at a figure much
below its actual value. It follows, therefore, that in arriving at the fair
market value it is necessary that the jury disregard not only the fact of
the filing of the case but should also disregard the effect of steps
taken by the condemning authority toward that acquisition. To hold
otherwise would permit a public body to depress the market value
of the property for the purpose of acquiring it at less than market
value.152
This position is substantially the same as that taken by the
courts of other states in denying the condemnor's claim that the prop-
erty should be valued at the date of actual taking.153  However,
neither Buena Park nor People ex rel. Department of Public Works v.
Lillard 54 argued that the depreciation in property values constituted
a "taking" or a "damaging" under the condemnation section of the
California Constitution; 55 both founded their position on the idea
that it is against public policy to allow a condemnor to announce a pro-
posed improvement that causes land values to fall, then later step in
and purchase the property at this depressed price.
Several California cases have expressed a view contrary to
Buena Park and Lillard, the most significant of these being Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Southern Pacific Company.'5" In
this case, the State Railroad Commissioner in 1927 issued an order for
construction of a depot upon the condemnee's property. The condem-
nation proceeding was not filed until December, 1933. At trial the
condemnee claimed that the order of 1927 so "stigmatized" the land
that when it was finally condemned in 1933 its value was materially
lower than it would have been in the absence of such order. The trial
court disallowed any testimony to this effect. The appellate court
affirmed the decision, stating that although the order caused a decline
in appellant's property value, "[t] he law does not.., lend a willing
ear to speculation .... The market value is an effect and we are not
(1936) (2d District); cf. Redevelopment Agency v. Maynard, 244 Cal. App.
2d 260, 265, 53 Cal. Rptr. 42, 46 (1966) (1st District).
150 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lillard, 219 Cal. App. 2d
368, 377, 33 Cal. Rptr. 189, 194 (1963 ) (3d District); Buena Park School Dist.
v4 Metrim Corp., 176 Cal. App. 2d 255, 258-59, 1 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253 (1959) (4th
District). See also Anderson, Consequences of Anticipated Eminent Domain
Proceedings-Is Loss of Value A Factor?, 5 SANTA CLARA LAw. 35 (1964) (in-
cisive comparison of Lillard and Buena Park with Atchison, Lucas and Par-
tridge).
15 176 Cal. App. 2d 255, 1 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1959).
152 Id. at 258-59, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
153 See cases cited note 143 supra.
'54 219 Cal. App. 2d 368, 33 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1963).
155 CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.
156 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 57 P.2d 575 (1936).
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governed by the cause that brings it about in order to determine it.'
1 57
The court quoted from San Diego Land and Town Company v.
Neale to the effect that the "benefits" arising from the proposed im-
provement may not be considered as an element of value,158 and went
on to ask, "If the benefits may not be considered, why consider the
detriment? A value so derived is too remote and speculative."'159
Atchison's reliance upon Neale in this context has been severely
criticized 6 0 Moreover, the court's argument that to compensate the
condemnee for depressed value is to engage in speculation is open to
serious question.
Concededly, it would be difficult to argue that the Commissioner's
order in 1927 constituted a "taking" or a "damaging" under Article I,
section 14 of the California Constitution, since the overwhelming
weight of California authority is against it. 1 1 However, it is difficult
to see how the condemnee is engaging in "speculation" by endeavor-
ing to prove the amount of his property's depreciation due to the
impending project. The most plausible explanation for this argument
of the court is that at the time of the Atchison decision, evidence of
sales of nearby property to prove the market value of the condemned
parcel was improper on direct examination. But this rule was subse-
quently changed by Los Angeles County v. Faus,'162 where it was held
that evidence of sales of "similar" property could be elicited on direct
examination. 1 3 In light of the Faus decision, therefore, it appears
that the condemnee, in conjunction with satisfying his burden of
persuasion on the issue of fair market value, 6 4 could easily introduce
sales evidence showing the value of his property just prior to the
instigation of the project as compared to its value when official con-
demnation took place. Through this method he not only would avoid
the speculation argument, but would receive truly "just compensa-
tion" by being recompensed for depreciation due to the condemnor's
project.
157 Id. at 517, 57 P.2d at 581.
158 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 74-75, 20 P. 372, 377
(1888).
159 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 518,
57 P.2d 575, 581 (1936).
160 See Anderson, Consequence of Anticipated Eminent Domain Proceed-
ings-Is Loss of Value A Factor?, 5 SANTA CLAR& LAW. 35 (1964).
161 See Heimann v. Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 754, 185 P.2d 597, 602
(1947); Eachus v. Los Angeles Ry., 130 Cal. 614, 621, 37 P. 750, 753 (1894);
Santa Clara County v. Curtner, 245 Cal. App. 2d 730, 746, 54 Cal. Rptr. 257,
267 (1966); Hilltop Properties v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 356, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 609 (1965); Gianni v. San Diego, 194 Cal. App. 2d 56, 61, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 783, 786 (1961); Stafford v. People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works,
144 Cal. App. 2d 79, 82, 300 P.2d 231, 233 (1956); Silva v. San Francisco, 87
Cal. App. 2d 784, 787, 198 P.2d 78, 80 (1948).
162 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957).
168 Id. at 676, 312 P.2d at 683; see CAL. EvD. CODE §§ 812, 816.
164 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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Under these circumstances it is irrelevant to distinguish the situa-
tion in which the property is at all times certain to be included in the
project from that in which the project site is indefinite. Nor does it
matter that a supplementary taking is involved. If the property is
definitely included, its market value is "frozen," or as one court put
it, "sterilized,"' 65 due to the fact that there can be no further expecta-
tion of private use and ownership. Accordingly, the market value of
the property cannot decrease subsequent to the time of its designation
for the project. Moreover, if the site of the value-depressing public
work is uncertain for a period, causing market values in a general
area to plummet, this should not be charged against the condemnee.
Although he does perhaps gain a windfall at the expense of adjacent
owners, the fact remains that it is his land that is being taken. The
statement in Atchison that the court cannot concern itself with the
causes of market value' 66 ignores that the cause of depression of mar-
ket values is the condemnor, who will reap the benefit of the property
owner's loss. To vest in a condemning agency, which is the moving
party, even the potential power to depress values for its own windfall
would create a serious impediment to justice.167 In such circum-
stances, the scales must be weighted in favor of the condemnee. In
light of this, there is clearly no merit to the illogical reasoning fol-
lowed by many courts, and quoted in Atchison, that "[i]f the bene-
fits [of the project] may not be considered, why consider the detri-
ment ... ?,168
Conclusion
The ultimate question in determining recovery for enhancement or
blight is whether or not the amount given is truly "just compensa-
tion," i.e., "just" to both condemnor and condemnee.169 As to en-
hancement, there should be no recovery for enhancement claimed to
have arisen after the designation of a site. The scales must balance
in favor of the condemnor in such a case, for, barring any unreason-
able delay, too great a financial burden would be otherwise imposed.
However, if enhancement arises prior to the determination of the site,
165 See note 42 supra.
166 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 517,
57 P.2d 575, 581 (1936). That the Supreme Court of Florida is indeed con-
cerned with the causes of market value is evidenced by its statement that
"compensation shall be based on value of the property as it would be at the
time of the taking if it had not been subjected to the debilitating threat of
condemnation and was not being taken." State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 158
So. 2d 753, 758 (Fla. 1963).
167 See NIcHoLLs § 12.3151(2); Anderson, Consequence of Anticipated
Eminent Domain Proceedings-Is Loss of Value A Factor?, 5 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 35, 41 n.32 (1964); cf. ORGEL §§ 105-06.
168 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 505, 517,
518, 57 P.2d 575, 581 (1936); see text accompanying notes 156-59 supra.
169 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Pera, 190 Cal. App. 2d
497, 499, 12 Cal. Rptr. 129, 130 (1961).
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it should be included in compensation as a genuine element of true
market value. Similar considerations are involved in the case of a
supplementary taking, the result depending upon whether the land
subsequently enveloped was or was not likely to be needed from the
inception of the overall project. Thus, with enhancement, "just
compensation" is measured by the property's market value as of
the day before it became certain or likely the land would be taken for
the project. In the case of blight, whether or not a particular site has
been determined is irrelevant. "Just compensation" here is achieved
when market value in all cases is determined as of the day before
news of the proposed project in general first reached the public.
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